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PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE NEW YORK STATUTES
ON ACCUMULATIONS
Robert S. Pasleyt
A prior article by the author discussed the 1960 amendments to the
New York statutes on perpetuities and power of appointment, enacted
on the recommendation of the Law Revision Commission.' This article
will discuss certain other matters, relating to accumulations, on which
the Commission (a) made no recommendations, or (b) made recommendations which did not result in legislation. Although this article is
based on two studies prepared by the author as consultant to the Law
Revision Commission,' nothing contained herein purports to represent
the official position of the Commission, except where its recommendations are actually quoted.
I.

THE 1959 LEGISLATION ON ACCUMULATIONS

As pointed out in the prior article,3 chapters 453 and 454 of the Laws
of 1959 amended the New York statutes on accumulation of the rents
and profits of real property, and the income of personal property, so as
to permit any direction for accumulation which is to commence within
the time allowed for the "vesting of future estates" in the case of real
property, or for "suspension of the absolute ownership" in the case of
personal property. Any direction for accumulation for a period extending beyond expiration of such time is to have the same effect as if such
accumulation were directed to terminate upon such expiration. The latter rule was the same under the old law, and is the rule under most state
statutes, although at common law the entire accumulation would prob4
ably be void.
With certain exceptions to be noted below, all other provisions directing
accumulation are invalid. Again, this is an echo of the prior law, but
with the liberalization of the purposes and the period for which accumulation can now be directed, it is hard to imagine how any direction for
accumulation would be totally void.
With the enactment of chapter 448 of the Laws of 1960, providing a
t

See contributors' section, masthead p. 138, for biographical data.

1 Pasley, "The 1960 Amendments to the New York Statutes on Perpetuities and Powers

of Appointment," 45 Cornell L.Q. 679 (1960).
2 Rule Against Perpetuities and Related Matters, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 69 (G) (1960);
Accumulations of Rents and Profits of Real Property and Income of Personal Property,
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (I) (1960).
3 Pasley, op. cit. supra note 1, at 686.
4 Simes, Future Interests, § 129 (1951).
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permissible perpetuities period of lives in being and twenty-one years,
the permissible period for accumulation now becomes the same as at
common law. The prior restrictions, limiting accumulations to those
for the benefit of one or more minors for the period of their minority,
have been eliminated. It would now seem permissible to direct an accumulation for the benefit of any person, or for any other purpose, so
long as the permissible period is not exceeded.
In addition, there are certain specific statutory exemptions and provisions which were not changed by the 1959 amendments. It is to these
that the balance of this article will be addressed. For convenience, they
will be treated under three headings:
(1) Exemptions relating to pension funds, insurance trusts,
and other miscellaneous matters.
(2) Disposition of accumulations not validly disposed of.
(3) Exemptions relating to accumulations for the benefit of
charity.

II.

ACCUMULATIONS FOR PENSION FUNDS, INSURANCE TRUSTS,
AND MISCELLANEOUS PURPOSES

The New York statutes continue to include the following provisions,
which have not been affected by the 1959 amendments:
(1) Provisos in Real Property Law, section 61, and Personal Property
Law, section 16, permitting accumulations under employee stock bonus
plans, pension plans, disability or death benefit plans, or profit-sharing
plans.
(2) A proviso in Personal Property Law, section 16, permitting funded
insurance trusts.
(3) Provisions in Personal Property Law, section 13-d, exempting from
the laws against accumulation of income a trust created under a retirement plan for which provision has been made under the laws of the
United States exempting such trust from federal income tax, and permitting accumulation of income from such trust until the period set for
distribution.
(4) Provisions in the Decedent Estate Law, section 47-3 (5) and (6),
authorizing accumulation of income in the case of a testamentary gift
to an unincorporated association to preserve its property pending
incorporation.
(5) Provisions in the Insurance Law, section 200(9), authorizing
accumulation of income in the case of a trust created under a "retire-
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ment system" authorized by said section 200 until, in the opinion of the
trustees, a sufficient sum exists to accomplish the purposes of the trusts.
(6) A provision in Personal Property Law, section 17-a, to the effect
that, unless otherwise directed, stock dividends arising under a trust
shall be treated as principal rather than income, and that addition of
such stock dividends to principal shall not be deemed an accumulation
of income.
(7) A provision in Personal Property Law, section 17-b, for the distribution of income from real or personal property earned during the
period of administration of the estate of a testator.
(8) Provisions in Personal Property Law, section 17-c, setting forth
rules for apportionment of principal and income arising from mortgage
investments under trusts and arising from mortgage salvage operations.
(9) Provisions in Personal Property Law, section 17-d, for apportionment as between principal and income under trusts consisting of bonds
or other obligations bought with a premium or at a discount, or maturing
with loss or gain.
(10) Provisions in Personal Property Law, section 17-d for determining the date of accrual of dividends on stock held in an estate, trust, or
other fund, for purposes of apportionment as between jrincipal and
income.
It was recommended to the Commission that no action be taken on
these statutory provisions at this time. They are all of relatively recent
enactment and deal with certain special situations which are peripheral
to the main problems under consideration, but which in the absence of
statute might raise a technical problem of unlawful accumulation.
III.

DISPOSITION OF INCOME WHERE No VALID DIRECTION
FOR ACCUMULATION

Real Property Law, section 63, provides that, where the power of
alienation has been suspended by a validly limited future interest, and
during such suspension there are undisposed rents and profits, and no
valid direction for their accumulation, they shall belong to the persons
presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate. If any person or
persons shall legally begin to receive such rents and profits, by virtue of
section 63 or otherwise, they shall continue to receive the same notwithstanding the subsequent birth of a child or children to any person
or persons receiving all or any part of such rents and profits. This section has been held applicable to income from personal property. 5
15 Matter of Harteau, 204 N.Y. 292, 97 N.E. 726 (1912).
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It should be noted that this statute covers two distinct situations:
(1) where there has been an invalid direction for accumulation; and (2)
where there has been no direction for accumulation.' The underlying
theory of the statute is said to be that those who are presumptively entitled to the estate and the rents and profits when the period of accumulation ends are entitled to anticipate the event and take the rents and
profits undisposed of or unlawfully directed to be accumulated.7 The
statute applies only where the following conditions are met: (1) there
is a valid limitation of an expectant estate (2) causing suspension of
the power of alienation, and (3) there is income undisposed of, and (4)
no valid direction for its accumulation. 8 The person "entitled to the
next eventual estate" is the person who would presumptively be entitled
to the estate at the end of the period of accumulation
This may be
the remainderman, a successor life tenant or legatee, or the life beneficiary
himself.'0
The ramifications of this statute are reviewed in a comprehensive
opinion by the late Surrogate Wingate, in which he declares that the
section is all-embracing and provides an exclusive rule of devolution
in those situations contemplated by its provisions." This opinion analyzes
the statute in terms of its purpose, scope, and operation, and reviews all
the important decisions down to the time of the decision. In another
case, however, also decided by Surrogate Wingate, the statute was held
inoperative if its application would result in circumventing the basic
principle of the statutes (as they stood before amendment) invalidating
all accumulations not for the benefit of minors.:2
No attempt will be made here to explain the detailed operation of
this statute. It will suffice to note that the subject is one of considerable
complexity and the application of the section is often very difficult. It
has been before the courts on numerous occasions. As one treatise puts
it, speaking of this statute and parallel statutes in other jurisdictions,
"it has caused a mass of litigation."' 3
There is reason to believe that the relaxation of the rules governing
accumulations effected by the 1959 amendments will reduce somewhat
6 6 American Law of Property § 25.111 (Casner ed. 1952).
7 Ibid.
8 Matter of Childs, 207 Misc. 1126, 143 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Surr. Ct. Suffolk County 1955).
9 St. John v. Andrews Institute for Girls, 191 N.Y. 254, 83 N.E. 981 (1908).

1o 6 American Law of Property § 25.111 (Casner ed. 1952) (citing illustrations from the
New York cases).
"1 Matter of Shupack, 158 Misc. 873, 287 N.Y. Supp. 184 (Surr. Ct. Kings County
1936).
12 Matter of Densen, 163 Misc. 232, 296 N.Y. Supp. 567 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1937).
13 3 Simes & Smith, Law of Future Interests § 1468 (1956) (citing annotation in 157
A.L.R. 668 (1946) and cases construing a similar Wisconsin statute).
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the number of cases in which this section will have to be invoked because
of an invalid direction for accumulation. It will not however affect situations where there has been no direction at all for accumulation. Extension of the permissible period by a gross period of twenty-one years may
increase somewhat the difficulty of determining the "persons presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate," but this is wholly speculative
at this stage.
The statute does not apply to all invalid accumulations, but only to
those where the necessary criteria for its application are present. In any
situation not covered by the statute, it seems that income accruing under
an invalid provision for accumulation is payable to the person or persons who would take if such accumulation had not been directed. This
might be the income beneficiary, the persons having an indefeasibly
vested interest in the principal, the residuary legatees, or the statutory
distributees. 14 The same result follows in any case of a void accumulation under the English statute on accumulations, as well as under many
16
American statutes." The rule seems to be the same at common law.
In 1947 Pennsylvania enacted a comprehensive statute on accumulations which provided, inter alia, for distribution of income released under
a void provision for accumulation. This statute provided generally that
such income "should be distributed as if no such accumulation had been
authorized," but also established a presumptive order of priority favoring: first, the current income beneficiaries, if any; second, the persons,
if any, who would be entitled to the accumulations if the time for payment thereof were accelerated to the time of accrual of the income;
third, the persons, if any, who, when the income accrued, were entitled
to other income from the same trust; fourth, the residuary legatees; and
7
fifth, the persons entitled to property undisposed of by the conveyance.'
Although characterized by Professor Powell as a "well worked out
statute,"' 8 it was repealed in 1955 and replaced by a much more liberal
14 Hawthorne v. Smith, 273 N.Y. 291, 7 N.E.2d 139 (1937)

(surplus income paid to life

beneficiary); United States Trust Co. v. Soher, 178 N.Y. 442, 70 N.E. 970 (1904) (surplus
income paid to next of kin); Matter of Vanderbilt, 229 App. Div. 574, 243 N.Y. Supp.
165 (1st Dep't 1930) (surplus income paid to residuary legatee); Matter of Clarkson,
201 Misc. 943, 107 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Surr. Ct. Suffolk County 1951) (surplus income paid
to life beneficiary); Matter of Withall, 191 Misc. 1016, 76 N.Y.S.2d 467 (Surr. Ct. Monroe
County 1948) (surplus income paid to life beneficiary); 3 Simes & Smith, Law of Future
Interests § 1468 (1956).
15 Law of Property Act of 1925, § 164(1), 15 Geo. 5, c. 20; 3 Simes & Smith, Law of
Future Interests § 1468 (1956).
16 Wilson v. D'Atro, 109 Conn. 563, 145 Atl. 161 (1929); 5 Powell, Real Property
§ 828, at 840 (1956) ; 3 Simes & Smith, Law of Future Interests § 1468 (1956).
17 Pa. Laws 1947, P.L. 100, § 8.
18 Powell, "Changes in the New York Statutes on Perpetuities and Accumulations: A
Report and a Proposal," 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1196, 1198 (1958); see also 5 Powell, Real
Property § 835, at 876 (1956).
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statute on accumulations. The latter includes a provision that income
subject to a void direction or authorization to accumulate shall be distributed to the person or persons in whom the right to such income has
vested by the terms of the instrument or by operation of law.19
Despite its complexity and the "mass of litigation" said to have been
provoked by it, there is a lack of convincing evidence that Real Property
Law, section 63, is working unsatisfactorily. The Pennsylvania statute
of 1947 probably offered a better solution, but experience under it was
too short-lived to permit of any conclusions. The author accordingly
recommended to the Commission that any proposal to amend section
63 be withheld until there had been a reasonable opportunity to observe
its operations under the amended statutes on accumulations generally.
The Commission accepted this recommendation and made no proposal
for amendment of section 63 in its 1960 program.
IV.

EXCEPTIONS TO RULE AGAINST ACCUMULATIONS-CHAIITIES

The present statutes (Real Property Law, section 61, and Personal
Property Law, section 16) include complex provisions permitting accumulations for various educational and charitable purposes, which have
not been amended. These provisos may be summarized as follows:
(1) The first proviso permits accumulation of the income from
property granted, conveyed, devised, or bequeathed in trust to any incorporated college or other incorporated literary institution for any of
the purposes specified in Real Property Law, section 114, or Personal
Property Law, section 13,20 or for the purpose of providing for the support of any teacher in a grammar school or institute, until the same
shall amount to a sum sufficient, in the opinion of the regents of the
university, to carry into effect any of such purposes.
(2) The second proviso states that if the principal of a trust fund
received by any incorporated college or other incorporated literary institution, or by the corporation of any city or village, or by the commissioners of common schools of any town, or by the trustees of any
school district, under any grant, conveyance, devise, or bequest for
any purpose for which trusts are authorized under Real Property Law,
section 114, or Personal Property Law, section 13,21 shall become di19 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 301.7 (Purdon Supp. 1959).
20 (i) To establish and maintain an observatory; (ii) to found and maintain professorships and scholarships; (iii) to provide and keep in repair a place for the burial of the
dead; or (iv) for any other specific purposes comprehended in the general objects authorized
by their respective charters.
21 In addition to the purposes specified in note 20 above, these statutes authorize gifts
in trust to certain municipal corporations for the purpose of education, the diffusion of

knowledge, or the relief of distress, or for parks, gardens, or other ornamental grounds,

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 46

minished from any cause, such diminution may be made up by the
accumulation of income from principal, in accordance with the directions
contained in the original gift, or if no such directions were given, then
in the discretion of the trustees; but in no case shall such accumulation
be allowed to increase the trust fund beyond the amount or value actually
received in the first instance, less liens and incumbrances and expenses
of acquisition.
(3) The third proviso states that where property is given, granted,
devised, or bequeathed in trust to a religious, educational, charitable or
benevolent corporation for any of its corporate purposes, up to onefourth of the value of such property, but not more than $50,000, may
be set aside for the accumulation of income until principal and accumulated income reach $100,000, whereupon such accumulation shall
be available as part of the permanent endowment of such corporation.
These provisos differ from the basic statutory provisions on accumulations in the following respects:
(1) They are not limited to cases where accumulation is directed in
the granting instrument but also cover accumulation within the discretion of the trustees or other officials by expressly permitting it within
stipulated limits.
(2) There is no time limit on the accumulation permitted.
(3) There are quantitative limitations, as follows:
(a) In the case of the educational institutions mentioned in the first
proviso, accumulation is permitted until, in the opinion of the "regents
of the university," the fund is large enough to accomplish its purposes.
(b) Under the second proviso, applicable to the same educational
institutions and to certain municipal corporations, accumulation is permitted to restore impairment of capital, but not beyond this.
(c) Under the third proviso, applicable to charitable corporations generally, it is necessary to earmark a limited portion of the principal (up
to twenty-five per cent or $50,000, whichever is less) for accumulation,
and the total accumulated fund may not exceed $100,000.
These provisos were enacted in 1846, 1855, and 1915, respectively, and
subsequently amended several times. Apparently they take the form
they do because of the restrictive statutory language in New York relating to charitable uses and trusts. Gifts to charitable corporations
were authorized only to specific types of donees for certain restricted
or grounds for the purpose of military parades and exercises, or health and recreation, and
gifts in trust to commissioners of common schools for any town, and to trustees of any
school district, for the benefit of the common schools of such town, or the schools of such
district.
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purposes.2 2 Charitable trusts as such were first held unauthorized under
the Revised Statutes and were only later authorized by statute.2" The
wording of the provisos accordingly reflects the rather restricted language
of sections 113 and 114 of the Real Property Law and sections 12 and
13 of the Personal Property Law relating to charitable uses and trusts.
It is in many respects obsolete and inapplicable to present-day conditions. Moreover it is uncertain whether the phrase "regents of the university" in the first proviso refers to the trustees of the educational or
literary institution concerned or to the Regents of the University of the
State of New York.
In considering possible amendments, the following questions seemed
relevant:
(1) What are the rules on accumulation for charity under the statutes
as amended in 1959?
(2) Do these rules apply only to cases where accumulation has been
directed in the granting instrument, or do they have a broader application?
(3) To what extent do these rules apply to charitable corporations
and foundations, as distinguished from charitable trusts?
(4) What is the extent of (a) judicial and (b) executive supervision
over all these matters under present law?
(5) What is the effect of current provisions of the United States Internal Revenue Code on the subject of accumulations for charitable
purposes?
(6) What is the common law rule on accumulations for charitable
purposes?
(7) What are the statutory provisions of other representative jurisdictions on this subject?
These questions will be taken up in order.
(1) Present Statutory Rules in New York on Accumulations for Charitable Purposes
Under Real Property Law, section 61, and Personal Property Law,
section 16, as amended in 1959, an accumulation may be validly directed
so long as it is to commence and terminate within the period allowed
for the vesting of future estates, 24 or for suspension of absolute owner22 N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1840, ch. 318; N.Y. Sess. Laws, 1841, ch. 261 (now N.Y. Real Prop.
Law § 114).
23 Tilden v. Green, 130 N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 880 (1891); Holland v. Alcock, 108 N.Y. 312,
16 N.E. 305 (1888); Holmes v. Meade, 52 N.Y. 332 (1873); N.Y. Sess. Laws 1893, th.
701 (now N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 113), overruling Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N.Y. 584 (1866).
24 This phrase is inappropriate, since the New York statutes speak in terms of suspension
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ship. If the direction is to accumulate for a longer time, it shall have
the same effect as if the accumulations were directed to terminate at
the end of such period.
There is no limitation as to the purpose for which or the person for
whose benefit such accumulation may be directed. There is no reason
why the present statute should not be construed as permitting an accumulation for charity within the permissible period. A contrary result
could be reached only if the subsequent provisos were read as limiting
the generality of the basic permissive provisions. This is, of course,
possible (which in itself is a good reason for recommending repeal of
the provisos) but it is unlikely. It would convert provisos which in
their origin were liberalizing into provisos which serve to restrict. It is
possible to give effect to both parts of the statute. The basic provision
would apply to any direction for accumulation, including one for charity,
measured by the permissible period. The provisos would apply (a)
where no specific period for accumulation is specified in the granting
instrument, or (b) where a period is specified in excess of the permissible period for vesting of future estates, or (c) where no direction for
accumulation is contained in the granting instrument, but accumulation
is deemed desirable by the trustees.
Prior to the 1960 amendments, the period allowed for the vesting of
future estates was any reasonable number of lives in being. This period
is not convenient for charitable trusts. It would not normally be selected
except (a) by a settior or trustee who was very conscious of the statutory
rules, or (b) where the gift to charity, with accumulated income, followed a life interest in a named person or persons.
In 1960, however, the statutes were amended to permit a period in
gross, whether following the measuring lives, or in lieu thereof.' 5 This
will be readily applicable to charitable trusts and might in fact obviate
the need for any special provision applicable thereto.
(2) Applicability of Restrictive Rules to Discretionary as Opposed to
MandatoryAccumulations
There is some authority outside of New York for the proposition that
the rules prohibiting or limiting accumulations, whether common law or
statutory, apply only where the accumulation is directed by the granting
instrument, and have no application where the trustee is merely authorof the power of alienation rather than remoteness of vesting. However the error, if it is
one, appeared in prior versions of Real Property Law, section 61, and was not a 1959
innovation. See Pasley, op. cit. supra note 1, at 686 n.27.
25 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1960, ch. 448.
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ized or permitted to accumulate. 6 A fortiori, under such a view, these
rules would have no application where the granting instrument is silent
on the subject, or the accumulation is accomplished by the trustee in his
own discretion, assuming such exercise of discretion did not violate the
27

terms of the granting instrument.

The Restatement of Property takes the opposite view. It first defines
the term "accumulation" so as to exclude any retention of income or
application of income to increase principal which is "found to be merely
in the course of judicious management of the trust.' 2 8 If however the
retention of income, or the application thereof to increase principal, is
not "in the course of judicious management," then it is an "accumulation" and is subject to regulation as to its duration, whether the trustee
is under a duty to accumulate or merely has a discretionary power to
do so.2

There is little question but that New York follows the Restatement
view and applies its statutory policy restricting accumulations, whether
the accumulation is mandatory, permissive, or discretionary (while at
the same time not fully adopting the liberal Restatement view which
excludes from the definition of "accumulation" any retention of income
or application thereof to principal which is "in the course of judicial
management"). Holdings and dicta in a number of cases make this clear.
Thus, in Hascall v. King,30 the application of income to the payment
of mortgages was held an invalid accumulation. Although here the accumulation was directed by the terms of the will, the language of the
case indicates that the result would have been the same even if the provision had been only permissive.
3 1 the question was
In Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice,
whether a provision in a deed of trust, permitting the trustee to allocate stock dividends to capital rather than income, violated the statutory rules against
26 Gerin v. McDonald,.64 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1933) (applying law of South Dakota). See
Cohen, "The Rule Against Accumulations and 'Wait and See'," 33 Temple L.Q. 34, at 46
n.62 (1959); Brownell v. Leutz, 149 F. Supp. 98 (D.N.D. 1957) (applying law of North
Dakota).
27 Cases cited note 26 supra.
28 Restatement, Property § 439 (a) (ii) (1944). Provisions for a reserve fund for depreciation and obsolescence is cited as an example of "judicious management." Id. illustration
2. Cf. In re Smith's Will, 253 Wis. 72, 33 N.W.2d 320 (1948), citing and applying this section.
29 Id comment b. The comment explains that this follows" from the use of the word
"can" in the definition set forth in § 439(a) (i):
A limitation provides for an accumulation, as the term is used in this Restatement, when
(a) a trust is so limited
(i) that part or all of the current income can be retained in the trust
or can be so applied by the trustee as to increase the fund subject to
the trust, ....
30 162 N.Y. 134, 56 N.E. 515 (1900).
31 250 N.Y. 1, 164 N.E. 723 (1928).
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accumulations.32 The court held that it did not, but on the ground that
stock dividends are predominantly not increments to income, but subdivisions of principal. "The quality that is typical must determine
whether they are permitted or forbidden. Doubts, when nicely balanced,
are resolved in favor of legality." The implication is that, if such dividends are clearly income, the statutes would be violated, and the fact
that the trustee was authorized in his discretion, rather than directed,
to treat them as principal would not change this. This is the clear import of the case, despite the fact that the court stated the question as
being: "Does the founder of a trust 'direct' an illegal accumulation...
when he provides...?"'
M
the trustees were permitted by the terms of
In Morris v. Morris,'
the trust to withhold part of the income from the life beneficiary (a
minor) and to accumulate it for the purpose of increasing the principal,
in such manner and in such amounts as to them seemed proper. The court
held this provision illegal and void and directed that the income accumulated during the lifetime of the life beneficiary (who had now
reached her majority) be paid to her, on the ground that this was the
only disposition consistent with the statutory framework. Payment to
the donor, as holder of the "next eventual estate" under Real Property
Law, section 63, would in this situation permit an evasion of the statutory
policy. The court said:
By the last sentence of paragraph three the trustees were permitted to
accumulate the income to increase the principal. This was illegal and
void as contrary to the provisions of the Personal Property Law, above
quoted.3 5
The court pointed out:
It will be noted that the donor in this trust agreement does not direct or
command any accumulation. At most he permits it.36
And in conclusion:
But such an accumulation, says the statute, can only be made for the
benefit of the infant, and when we once begin accumulating, and such
accumulation for a period of years is legal, then the accumulation must
be disposed
of as the statute directs, that is, it must be paid to the
37
infant.
In Matter of Clark,3" what might otherwise have been an invalid ac32 Pers. Prop. Law § 17-a, which permits this, had been enacted but did not apply to
the facts of this case.
33 250 N.Y. 1, 10, 164 N.E. 723, 724 (1928).
34 272 N.Y. 110, 5 N.E.2d 56 (1936).
35 Id. at 115, N.E.2d at 58.
36 Id. at 119, 5 N.E.2d at 60.
37 Id. at 120, 5 N.E.2d at 60.
38 306 N.Y. 733, 117 N.E.2d 910 (1954), affirming 281 App. Div. 905, 120 N.Y.S.2d 126
(2d Dep't 1953).
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cumulation (use of depreciation reserves 39 to pay off a mortgage and to
offset a capital loss of a subsidiary) was upheld, apparently on the theory
that these were corporate acts and not acts of the trustee as such, the
corpus of the trust consisting of the stock of the corporation. The trust
instrument itself contained no directions on the subject. Judge Froessel,
dissenting in the Court of Appeals, and Justice Beldock, dissenting in the
Appellate Division, argued that where, as here, the trustee controlled
the corporation, the corporation entity should be disregarded and the
payments held invalid. Judge Froessel argued that such payments "violated the settled policy of the State against accumulations." Justice
Beldock thought that income was being taken from the income beneficiary
and given to the remainderman.
In two prior lower court cases, Matter of Adler" and Matter of
McLaughlin,41 very similar on their facts to Matter of Clarke, the courts
disregarded the corporate entity and held invalid the use of income to
reduce mortgage indebtedness, where the effect was to withhold income
from the income beneficiaries and enhance the interests of the remaindermen. The decisions were placed on the twofold ground that the public
policy of the State is against accumulations and that income belonging
rightfully to the income beneficiary may not be used to increase the
interest of the remainderman. Here again, the trustees, in controlling
the operations of the corporations whose stock they held, were acting
in their discretion and not in accordance with any directions contained
in the trust instrument. As Surrogate Delehanty said in the McLaughlin
case:
The testator here did not in his will direct his executrix-trustee expressly to use corporate net income to extinguish the debt. . . While
the statute forbids a direction by a testator for an accumulation it is
aimed essentially at the fact of accumulation rather than the state of
mind of the testator.
42 It is intended to prevent the sterilizing of the usufruct of an estate.
In Matter of Talbot,43 the will directed that all cash conceded to be
income be distributed accordingly. The court said, by way of dictum:
There might be unsurmountable legal obstacles to the capitalization of
any income other than that earned during the period of administration,
39 From an accounting standpoint, of course, depreciation reserves cannot be "used"
to pay off anything since they are only bookkeeping credits corresponding to charges
against income. But once the dubious assumption is made that a charge against trust
income on account of depreciation is an "accumulation" of income, it follows that a
subsequent payment of cash on capital account, charged against the depreciation reserve
thus created, is a "use" of accumulated income which would violate the former statutory
rule that accumulations may only be for the benefit of a minor.
40 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County, 1937).
41 164 Misc. 539, 299 N.Y. Supp. 559 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1937).
42 Id. at 542, 299 N.Y. Supp. at 563.
43 170 Misc. 138, 9 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Surr. Ct. Orange County 1939).
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for by section 16 of the Personal Property Law such income cannot be
accumulated, except for the benefit of one or more minors in being at the
death of the testator, which accumulations must end at or before the
expiration of their minority.
• .. The prohibition
of accumulation of income represents the public
44
policy of the State.
In Matter of James,45 the trustee requested authority to use the principal of a sinking fund (previously accumulated in accordance with the
provisions of the trust instrument with the approval of the court) to discharge certain mortgage indebtedness in accordance with an authorization contained in the trust instrument. The court refused to reconsider
the validity of the sinking fund itself, holding that this question was
res judicata, but denied the application to use the moneys in the sinking
fund to discharge mortgages, on the ground that this would be an invalid
accumulation. Even though building up a sinking fund out of income,
as a reserve against future reduction in the value of the corpus, subject
to control of the court, might be valid, the use thereof to discharge capital
indebtedness is as objectionable as a direct use of income for the purpose would be.
The court said:
' . * the legislative policy against accumulations of income is applicable to any income retained for the deliberate purpose of addition to corpus
or principal. The suggestion is, in effect, precisely the same as if the
settlor had unequivocally required the trustee to directly apply the income
to increase the principal of the trust. The statute intends that income
must be used as it accrues and46not to build up future estates where some
of the beneficiaries are adults.
Concededly, none of these cases involved accumulations for charity.
But the principle would be the same, given the existence of legal restrictions on the duration or extent of such accumulations. Thus, the Restatement of Property, after first laying down the rule that,
An otherwise effective limitation which provides for an accumulation
in
47
favor of a charity is subject to judicial supervision as to its duration.
states in the comment,
* **,It is immaterial that the accumulation for the charity is to occur
only "in the trustee's
discretion," if expenditure for charitable purposes is
48
the alternative.
On the other hand, there is a line of cases indicating that the New York
statutory restrictions on accumulations apply only where the trustee is
directed or authorized to accumulate by the granting instrument. The
44 Id. at 141, 9 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
45 6 Misc. 2d 849, 159 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1957).
46
47
48

Id. at 851-52, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
Restatement, Property § 442 (1944).
Id. comment e.
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strongest, as well as the most recent, statement to this effect is found
in a federal district court case arising under the law of New York, Kibbe
v. City of Rochester.4 9 Testator left the residue of his estate to the City
of Rochester for the purpose of erecting, equipping, and maintaining a
"Library and Fine Arts Building" for the use and enjoyment of the
people of Rochester, to be known as the "Rundel Memorial Building."
The city received a portion of the residue, $353,968, in 1919, and the
balance, $369,618, in 1928 (after an intervening life estate had terminated). The city held these funds for several years without doing anything with them. Testator's heirs and next of kin then sued to have the
funds paid over to them on a resulting trust, on the theory that the
original trust had failed through the city's neglect and non-user, and that
this was in effect an abandonment of the trust.
The court held that the legacy created a trust with legal title in the
city, with an obligation on the trustee to carry out the testator's purposes, that the trust had not been abandoned, and that plaintiffs had no
interest in the fund. The court said the result would be the same if the
legacy were construed as an outright gift, not in trust. The court overruled the plaintiffs' contention that the statutes on accumulation had
been violated (the fund having accumulated during the period of nonuser), saying
In the Rundel will there is no direction for an accumulation, and there is
no necessity for the immediate expenditure of the income from the funds
set aside for the building. No definite time has been set for the erection of
the building, but it is rather, and wisely, left to the discretion of the
donee. If the donee has not seen fit to build immediately, it cannot be said
that the gift is invalid because the donee has not kept it so that there
would be no income .... The defendant does not contend that it could not
use the money immediately on its becoming available for carrying out the
testator's purpose, but only that it deemed it inadvisable to so do, and that
it was not required to do so by the terms of the gift.50
The decision is unquestionably sound in holding that the plaintiffs had
no interest in the fund. That being so, plaintiffs had no standing, as heirs
or next of kin, to challenge the legality of a de facto accumulation which
had not been directed or expressly authorized by the testator. This is
not to say, however, that in a proper proceeding, brought by the Attorney
General or interested member of the public, to compel proper application
of the trust funds, a court might not have held the accumulation illegal
and directed its termination.
In going further and holding that the New York law condemns only
49 57 F.2d 542 (W.D.N.Y. 1932).
5o Id. at 548-49.
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those accumulations which are directed, or expressly or impliedly authorized, by the trust instrument the court cited four New York cases.51 An
examination of these cases, and of certain others cited by them in turn,
discloses the following:
(a) None is more recent than 1918.
(b) In two,5 2 the statements to this effect are dicta, or at best alternative grounds for the decisions reached.
(c) In four,53 there were special circumstances, in that the income
beneficiary was either incompetent or imprisoned and could not use all
the income. In each of these situations the court held that the surplus
income should be held for later payment to the income beneficiary and
that this would merely be an accumulation arising incidentally from
the administration of the trust and not within the condemnation of the
statutes.
(d) In the one remaining case,54 which involved a charitable trust, the
fund had been allowed to accumulate to some extent. The court refused
to uphold the contention of the residuary legatees that the accumulations were invalid and therefore should fall into the residue, but directed
their application cy pres. This would have been the correct result even
if the court had held the accumulations illegal. 55
It seems fair to conclude that the New York statutory restrictions on
accumulation apply, in the case of both private and charitable trusts,
whether the trustee is directed by the trust instrument to accumulate
or is expressly or impliedly authorized to do so, and also (except perhaps
the special situations found in the City of Rochester case and the cases
cited therein) when he does so in his own discretion.
(3) Applicability of Statutory Restrictions on Accumulations to Charitable Corporationsand Foundations
The basic restrictions on accumulation set forth in Real Property Law,
section 61, and Personal Property Law, section 16, apply (so far as
51 Matter of Bavier, 164 App. Div. 358, 149 N.Y. Supp. 728 (1st Dep't 1914); Hill v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 163 App. Div. 374, 148 N.Y. Supp. 601 (1st Dep't 1914); Camp v.
Presbyterian Soc'y, 105 Misc. 139, 173 N.Y. Supp. 581 (Sup. Ct. Jefferson Eq. T. 1918);
Matter of Langdon, 89 Misc. 333, 153 N.Y. Supp. 574 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County (1915).
52 Livingston v. Tucker, 107 N.Y. 549, 14 N.E. 443 (1887); Matter of Stevens, 46 Misc.
623, 95 N.Y. Supp. 297 (Surr. Ct. Chautauqua County 1905).
53 Hill v. Guaranty Trust Co., 163 App. Div. 374, 148 N.Y. Supp. 601 (1st Dep't 1914);
Matter of Bavier, 164 App. Div. 358, 149 N.Y. Supp. 728 (1st Dep't 1914); Matter of
Bavier, 164 App. Div. 363, 149 N.Y. Supp. 731 (1st Dep't 1914); Matter of Langdon, 89
Misc. 333, 153 N.Y. Supp. 574 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1915). Cf. Matter of Meyer, 140
Misc. 1, 249 N.Y. Supp. 451 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1931).
54 Camp v. Presbyterian Soc'y, 105 Misc. 139, 173 N.Y. Supp. 581 (Sup. Ct. Jefferson
Eq. T. 1918).
55 Cf. Matter of Kirkbride, 261 App. Div. 853, 24 N.Y.S.2d 375 (3d Dep't 1941), motion
for leave to appeal denied, 285 N.Y. 859, 32 N.E.2d 835 (1941).
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their wording is concerned) to "directions" for accumulation contained
"inany instrument sufficient to pass such property." The provisos in
favor of charities, which as noted above are not limited to situations
where the original instrument "directs" an accumulation, all refers to
transfers of property "in trust" (first and third provisos) or to a "trust
fund" received by the institution concerned (second proviso).
Regardless of wording, it is obvious that a restriction on accumulation
can operate only where property is held in some sort of trust or fiduciary
relationship. It is clear that the New York restrictions apply to express
trusts. It is equally clear that they do not and cannot apply to property
owned outright. "A man may accumulate income on his own property.
Likewise, so long as the stockholders do not object, a corporation may
accumulate income, and 'plow in' surplus instead of distributing it as
dividends." 5 6
But what of the charitable corporation or foundation? Does it hold
its property "in trust" or does it hold it outright? The answer would seem
to lie somewhere in between these two extremes and to require the drawing of certain distinctions. Scott says:
It is not infrequently stated in the cases that a charitable corporation
does not hold upon a charitable trust property conveyed or bequeathed to
it. In fully as many cases, however, it is stated that a charitable corporation holds its property in trust. It is sometimes said that a charitable corporation holds property in trust if the property is to be used only for a
particular charitable purpose or if only the income is to be used.
A charitable corporation certainly does not hold its property beneficially
in the same sense in which an individual or non-charitable corporation can
hold it beneficially, since in the case of a charitable corporation the
Attorney General can maintain a suit to prevent a diversion of the property
from the purposes for which it was given. In states which, like New
York, formerly did not permit charitable trusts, a conveyance inter vivos
or a devise or bequest to a charitable corporation was valid, unless forbidden by statute, even though by the terms of the instrument of conveyance or will it was provided that the corporation should use the property
only for a particular one of its purposes, and even though it was provided
that the principal should be held in perpetuity and only the income expended ....
....

The truth is that it cannot be stated dogmatically either that a

charitable corporation is or that it is not a trustee. The question is in each
case whether a rule which is applicable to trustees is applicable to charitable
corporations, with respect to unrestricted or restricted property. Ordinarily
the rules which are applicable to charitable trusts are applicable to charitable corporations, as we have seen, although some are not. It is probably
more misleading to say that a charitable corporation is not a trustee than
to say that it is, but the statement that it is a trustee must be taken
with some qualifications.7
56 Simes, "Statutory Restrictions on the Accumulation of Income," 7 U. Chi. L. Rev.
409, 426-27 (1940).
57 4 Scott, Trusts § 348.1, at 2553-59 (1956).
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The Restatement is to the same effect:
Where property is given to a charitable corporation, particularly where
restrictions are imposed by the donor, it is sometimes said by the courts
that a charitable trust is created and that the corporation is a trustee.
It is sometimes said, however, that a charitable trust is not created.
This is a mere matter of terminology. The important question is whether
and to what extent the principles and rules applicable to charitable trusts
are applicable to charitable corporations.6 5
Bogert is more definite in drawing a distinction:
Occasionally it becomes important to learn whether a donor intended
to make an absolute gift to a charitable corporation to be used by it for
one or more of its corporate purposes, or desired to make the charitable
corporation trustee of a charitable trust. It is clear that there is a distinction in these two intents and the legal results of their expression. In the
first case the gift is outright and absolute. No trust in a technical sense
is involved. There is merely the duty on the part of the corporation to use
its property for its corporate purpose, and not to do an ultra vires act.
The state, through the Attorney General, could doubtless force the corporation to live within its charter. In the second instance the charitable corporation takes the bare legal interest and is subject to a bill brought by
the Attorney General to compel obedience to the duties of a charitable
trustee. 59
In general, the New York courts have taken the position that a gift to
a charitable corporation, where no words of trust are used and no intent
to create a trust can be found, does not establish a trust but is an
outright gift to the corporation to use for its corporate purposes.6 0
This result has sometimes been reached even when words of trust were
used, if the primary intention seemed to be to make an outright gift to
the corporation to be used by it for one or more of its corporate
purposes. 61
It is true that many of the earlier decisions so holding were inspired,
in part at least, by a desire to uphold charitable gifts at a time when
the law of New York did not recognize charitable trusts.6 2 Be that as
it may, the rule has continued to be affirmed in virtually all the New
York cases.
58 Restatement (Second), Trusts § 348, comment f (1957).
59 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 324, at 439-43 (1953).
60 Cadman Memorial Congregational Soc'y v. Kenyon, 306 N.Y. 151, 166, 116 N.E.2d
481, 487 (1953); St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E.2d 305 (1939); Matter
of Durand, 194 N.Y. 477, 87 N.E. 677 (1909); Bird v. Merklee, 144 N.Y. 544, 39 N.E. 645
(1895) ; Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 450 (1873).
61 Tabernacle Baptist Church v. Fifth Ave. Baptist Church, 60 App. Div. 327, 70 N.Y.
Supp. 181 (1st Dep't 1901), aff'd, 172 N.Y. 598, 64 N.E. 1126 (1902). Cf. Fowler, The
Law of Charitable Uses, Trusts and Donations in New York 115 (1896).
62 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 324, at 443 (1953); Note, "The Charitable Corporation," 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1168, 1171-72 (1951); N.Y. Law Revision Commission, Recommendations and Study re Application of Cy Pres Doctrine to Prevent Failure of a Gift for
Charitable Purposes, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (S) pp. 17-19 (1953).
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Some of these cases expressly state or hold that the rules applicable
to perpetuities, and other rules applicable to private trusts, do not apply
to property held outright by a charitable corporation.63 Relatively few
cases, however, involve the subject of accumulations. Such cases as there
are suggest the following conclusions:
(a) A gift to a charitable corporation for a specific, limited purpose,
whether or not considered a technical trust, is subject to the restrictions
set forth in the provisos in the accumulation statutes relating to charities.
For example, the case of Matter of Whittelsey 4 involved a will making
a gift in remainder to the Metropolitan Museum of Art to purchase
objects of art for "The Elisha Whittelsey Collection," the income from
the fund to be first accumulated, if necessary, until it reached the value
of the estate as originally fixed in the transfer tax proceedings. When
the remainder took effect in possession, the fund had been substantially
impaired in value and was much less than the value originally fixed.
Surrogate Foley applied the statute and held that the accumulation
could be upheld only to the extent permitted by the third proviso of
section 16 of the Personal Property Law (the other two being inapplicable).
Similarly, in Matter of Lewis65 it was held that a legacy to Cornell
University to establish a permanent endowment for the "Nellie M. Lewis
Scholarship" in the College of Arts and Sciences of said University, to
be awarded annually by the Scholarship Committee of the Federation
of Cornell Women's Clubs to a woman undergraduate in any class of
said College, involved an invalid accumulation, in that the testator had
provided that if the value of the legacy should prove to be less than
$10,000, the annual income therefrom should be added to principal until
the latter, with accumulated income, reached $10,000. The court upheld
the gift without the accumulation.
(b) If the gift is for the general purposes of the corporation, without
limitation to specific objects, but with a proviso that only income is to
be used and the principal is to remain intact, it would seem that the
accumulation rules do not apply, but substantially the same result is
reached by virtue of the courts holding that the income must be expended in accordance with the directions of the donor and may not be
63 St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 119, 22 N.E.2d 305, 307 (1939).
Cf.
Brayton v. Christ Church, 249 App. Div. 290, 292 N.Y. Supp. 131 (4th Dep't 1936), aff'd,
275 N.Y. 631, 11 N.E.2d 792 (1937) (personal exemption from double liability enjoyed
by a trustee holding bank stock not available to a charitable corporation holding such
stock); Bird v. Merklee, 144 N.Y. 544, 550, 39 N.E. 645, 646-47 (1895); Wetmore v.
Parker, 52 N.Y. 450, at 459 (1873).
64 180 Misc. 602, 41 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1943).
65 199 Misc. 463, 99 N.Y.S.2d 986 (Surr. Ct. Erie County 1950).
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added to principal, for example by being used to discharge a mortgage
or to make capital improvements. 6 Conversely, in such a case principal
may not be used for current expenditures contrary to the directions of
6 7 On a proper
the donor.
showing of necessity, however, the court may,
under a doctrine akin to cy pres, known as "deviation," authorize the
use of income to make capital improvements or the use of principal' to
meet current expenses, where otherwise the charitable purpose would
fail.6 The fact that this power exists and is exercised, although rarely,
seems to indicate that the restrictions on accumulations do not apply.
The point is not, however, mentioned in the cases.
(c) In the case of a wholly unrestricted gift to a charitable corporation, it would appear that the statutory restrictions on accumulations do
not apply. This follows from the considerations, repeated over and over
in the cases, (i) that such property is not held in trust, and (ii) the only
restriction on its use is that it be applied to corporate purposes. While
no cases have been found expressly so holding, in a few this seems to
be the actual result under the facts and the decisions reached. 9 There
is a dictum in one Court of Appeals case that "section 61 of the Real
Property Law... as to accumulations and section 221 of the Tax Law...
refer generally to such [i.e., charitable] corporations," 7 but this seems
to be too broad.
Even in this situation (as will be more fully discussed in the next section) the courts have the power to prevent any improper use of the
funds of a charitable corporation, or to correct a failure to use them
for corporate purposes, and the Attorney General may bring an action
to such end. 71 This could, of course, include situations where an unreasonable accumulation of income had prevented the carrying out of
the corporate purpose.
(d) A related but nevertheless distinct rule is that, where there is an
immediate gift to a charitable corporation or unincorporated association
to be formed, the corporation or association, when it is formed, takes
the gift plus all accumulations of income arising in the interval, and
66 St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Bennett, 2&1 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E.2d 305 (1939); Matter of Mauser,
151 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Surr. Ct. Herkimer County 1956).
67 Matter of Brooklyn Children's Aid Soc'y, 269 App. Div. 789, 55 N.Y.S.2d 323 (2d
Dep't 1945).
68 Knickerbocker Hosp. v. Goldstein, 181 Misc. 540, 41 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. Sp. T.
N.Y. County 1943).
69 Cf. Corporation of the Chamber of Commerce v. Bennett, 143 Misc. 513, 257 N.Y.
S.2d (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1932); Matter of James, 123 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Surr. Ct. N.Y.
County 1953).
70 Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 N.Y. 462, 130 N.E. 613 (1921).
71 St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 119, 22 N.E.2d 305, 307 (1939).
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there is no violation of the rules against accumulation.72 Where, how-

ever, the gift is to take effect in the future, for example, at the termination of an intervening life estate, the accumulation statutes do apply.7"
(4) Extent of Judicial Supervision Over Charitable Trusts and Charitable Corporations
In nearly all Anglo-American jurisdictions it is recognized that a court
of equity has general supervisory power over charitable trusts and, perhaps to a less extent, over charitable corporations.7 4 Most commonly
this power is exercised to direct compliance with the trust or corporate
purpose, 75 or to prevent a failure thereof by applying cy pres,76 but it
also covers such matters as decreeing a termination of a charitable trust
in an appropriate case,77 appointment of trustees of a charitable corporation to fill vacancies where no other method is available, 78 and other
matters.7 9 It includes supervision of the reasonableness of an accumulation. 0
Normally the intervention of an equity court is sought by the Attorney General as representative of the public interest,8 or by the trustee
or corporation itself in an action naming the Attorney General as a party
72 Matter of Juillard, 238 N.Y. 499, 144 N.E. 772 (1924); Trustees of Sailors' Snug
Harbor v. Carmody, 211 N.Y. 286, 105 N.E. 543 (1914); Matter of Potts, 205 App. Div.
147, 199 N.Y. Supp. 880 (3d Dep't 1923). Cf. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 113 (2-a) ; N.Y. Pers.
Prop. Law § 12 (2-a).
73 Matter of Juillard, 238 N.Y. 499, 144 N.E. 772 (1924) ; St. John v. Andrews Institute,
191 N.Y. 254, 83 N.E. 981 (1908); Cf. Matter of Donchian, 120 Misc. 535, 199 N.Y. Supp.
107 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1923).
74 Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 N.Y. 462, 130 N.E. 613 (1921); Allen v. Stevens,
161 N.Y. 122, 55 N.E. 568 (1899); 4 Scott, Trusts §§ 348, 348.1, at 2552, 2554 (1956);
Tudor, Charities 174-93 (5th ed. 1929); Note, "The Charitable Corporation," 64 Harv. L.
Rev. 1168 (1951).
75 St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E.2d 305 (1939); Matter of James,
123 N.Y.S.2d 520, 525 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1953).
76 Matter of Brundrett, 87 N.YS.2d 851 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1940); Newman, Trusts
180, 194-99 (1955) ; 4 Scott, Trusts §§ 348.1, 399, at 2554, 2824-55 (1956).
77 Matter of Stafford, 258 Pa. 595, 102 AtI. 222 (1917). This power is, however, not
exercised where it would be contrary to the interest of the settlor and it is possible to
carry out the original trust; 4 Scott, Trusts § 367A, at 2622-27 (1956); Franklin Foundation v. Attorney General, 163 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1960); Winthrop v. Attorney General,
128 Mass. 258 (1880).
78 Goldstein v. Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor, 277 App. Div. 269, 98 N.Y.S.2d 544
(1st Dep't 1950).
79 E.g., disposition of surplus: 4 Scott, Trusts § 400, at 2858-62 (1956). (But apparently
this applies only to a charitable trust. It has been held that the court may not control
the disposition of the surplus funds of an existing charitable corporation, not held in trust,
so long as they are used for corporate purposes. Corporation of the Chamber of Commerce v. Bennett, 143 Misc. 513, 257 N.Y. Supp. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1932). Quaere
whether this is still good law after the ruling in the St. Joseph's Hosp. case, supra note 75,
which seemed to indicate a trend to assimilate the law of charitable corporations with that
of charitable trusts. See Taylor, "A New Chapter in the New York Law of Charitable
Corporations," 25 Cornell L.Q. 382 (1940).)
80 St. Paul's Church v. Attorney General, 164 Mass. 188, 204, 41 N.E. 231, 237 (1895);
2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 353, at 523; Restatement, Property § 442 (1944).
81 4 Scott, Trusts § 391, at 2753-56 (1956); See, e.g., Goldstein v. Trustees of Sailors'
Snug Harbor, 277 App. Div. 269, 98 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1st Dep't 1950).
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defendant.8 2 Occasionally, though rarely, the court's jurisdiction may be
invoked by another "interested party," usually a beneficiary having a
definite claim,83 or a donor having some sort of special interest in performance of the trust or a reversionary interest on its termination or
failure.84
In New York these rules are codified in Real Property Law, section
113, and in Personal Property Law, section 12.85 In brief, these statutes
provide as follows:
(a) The Supreme Court has control over all gifts, grants, devises, and
bequests to religious, educational, charitable or beneficial uses which are
otherwise valid. This includes express recognition of the cy pres power.
(b) The Surrogate's Court has concurrent and similar jurisdiction with
the Supreme Court in the case of devises and bequests to charitable uses.
(c) These powers extend to gifts to corporations or unincorporated
associations for religious, charitable, educational or beneficial purposes,
whether or not an express trust is created.
(d) The Attorney General is to represent the beneficiaries in all such
cases, and it is his duty to enforce "such trusts" by proper proceedings
in the courts.
(e) The Supreme Court is empowered, in appropriate cases, to authorize the sale or mortgage of property held by a charitable trustee or
corporation, on notice to the Attorney General and to any persons having
reversionary or remainder interests in such property.
These powers have been invoked in numerous cases. In nearly all of
them the Attorney General has been a party, whether as plaintiff br defendant, appellant or respondent. There is every reason to believe that
the Attorney General takes his duties under these statutes very seriously. He has not been a mere nominal party in the cases in which he
has appeared. Some of these he has initiated as party plaintiff; in many
he has appealed from lower court rulings which he considered erroneous.
Although no New York cases have been found in which the equitable
power of the court has been invoked or exercised on the specific subject
of accumulations (except in cases involving a question of validity or
invalidity under the statutes), there is no question but that, under the
See, e.g., St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E.2d 305 (1939).
(1956). Cf. Matter of Jones, 191 Misc. 617, 78
N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1948) (proceeding to construe will).
84 4 Scott, Trusts § 391, at 2762-64 (1956). Cf. Associate Alumni v. Theological Seminary,
163 N.Y. 417, 57 N.E. 626 (1900).
85 See, generally, N.Y. Law Revision Commission, Recommendation and Study re Application of Cy Pres Doctrine to Prevent Failure of a Gift for Charitable Purposes, N.Y.
Leg. Doc. No. 65 (S) 1953.
82

83 4 Scott, Trusts § 391, at 2758-62
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general law recognized throughout the United States, the power exists
with respect to the reasonableness or propriety of an accumulation for
charitable purposes, as well as with respect to its legality. 6 There is
no reason to believe that the law of New York is otherwise.
Of recent, there has been considerable discussion of the question
whether this traditional approach to the supervision of charitable trusts,
corporations, and foundations is adequate. Some of the literature is
cited in the footnote. 7 The answer generally given is that it is not, and
that legislation is necessary. The reasons given, among others, are:
(a) While the amount of wealth held in charitable trusts or by charitable corporations and foundations has reached staggering proportions,
in the absence of statute there is no effective means for obtaining information on the subject or for requiring sudh trustees, corporations, and
foundations to render regular accountings.
(b) Partly for this reason and partly because of the preoccupation
with other seemingly more pressing problems, the intervention of the
Attorney General is apt to be sporadic and ineffective.
(c) The courts are reluctant to exercise their powers, except in clear
cases where funds are being diverted from their purpose or it is necessary to invoke cy pres to prevent failure of a charitable purpose.
(d) The cy pres power itself is inadequate in the light of modern
conditions.
The most comprehensive study yet made is the 1952 Report of the
British Charitable Trusts Committee, commonly called the Nathan Report.88 The findings and recommendations of this report have been ably
reviewed and compared with the American situation by Professor
Bogert."9 The Nathan Report found that the private charity still has a
place in the "welfare state," but that there is need for improved procedures for keeping records and making reports, that the rules on investments should be liberalized, that the cy pres power should be en86 Supra note 80.
87 4 Scott, Trusts

§ 391, at 2755-56 (1956); Taylor, Public Accountability of Foundations
and Charitable Trusts (Russell Sage Foundation 1953); Bogert, "Proposed Legislation
Regarding State Supervision of Charities," 52 Mich. L. Rev. 633 (1954); Bogert, "The
Nathan Report and the Supervision and Enforcement of Charitable Trusts," 29 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1069 (1954); Forer, "Forgotten Funds: Suggesting Disclosure Laws for Charitable
Funds," 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1044 (1957); Karst, "The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar:
An Unfilled State Responsibility," 73 Harv. L. Rev. 433 (1960); Vestal, "Critical Evaluation
of the Charitable Trust As a Giving Device," 1957 Wash. U.L.Q. 195; Note, "Supervision
of Charitable Trusts," 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 118 (1953). Cf. Sines, Public Policy and the Dead
Hand, ch. 5 (1955); Scott, "Education and the Dead Hand," 34 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1920).
88 Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice Relating to Charitable Trusts, Cmd.
No. 8710 (1952).
89 Bogert, "The Nathan Report and the Supervision and Enforcement of Charitable
Trusts," 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1069 (1954). See also "The Nathan Committee Report," 102
LJ. 703 (1952); Graveson, "The Report on Charitable Trusts," 215 L.T. 326 (1953).
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larged, and that the existing administrative machinery for supervision
of charities (through the Charity Commission) should be improved and
strengthened. Excepted from a major part of the recommendations, in
accord with prior practice, would be the existing universities (but not
necessarily new universities), cathedrals and collegiate churches, churches
in general (except to the extent already subject to the Charitable Trusts
Act), the British Museum, and certain similar bodies. These institutions
should, however, with the consent of their trustees, enjoy the benefits
of the proposed enlarged cy pres powers.
In this country, the Attorneys General themselves have taken the lead
in sponsoring remedial legislation." The first state to enact legislation
requiring the reporting of charitable trusts was New Hampshire in 1943."'
The Commission on Uniform Laws has approved a Uniform Supervision
of Charitable Trusts Act, 92 which has been adopted in California. 3 Somewhat similar legislation has been enacted in Rhode Island,9 4 Ohio,9" South
Carolina,96 and Massachusetts. 7 Idaho has a more limited reporting requirement.9 8 In New York, all charitable corporations, except religious
and educational groups, are required to register with the Department of
Social Welfare before commencing fund raising campaigns, and are required thereafter to file annual financial reports.9 9 The New York
statute so providing gives the Attorney General broad enforcement
10 0
powers.
The scheme of the Uniform Supervision of Charitable Trusts Act is
to provide for a Register of Charities in the office of the Attorney General, and to require the filing of copies of all instruments establishing
charitable trusts and the filing of periodic reports concerning the assets
of the trust and the administration thereof. The Attorney General is
given broad investigatory and subpoena power and is authorized to enforce compliance with the act in the courts. The act applies to all charitable-trusts power, and to property held by a charitable corporation for
a particular purpose as distinguished from property held for the general
purposes of the corporation. Governmental agencies, religious organiza90 See Bogert, "Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities," 52 Mich.
L. Rev. 633, 641-52 (1954).
91 N.H. Laws 1943, ch. 181 (now 1 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 7:19-32 (1955)).
92 9C ULA 208-15 (1957).
93 Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12580-96
Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 1258).

(made permanent legislation, with one change, by

94 3 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 18-9-1 to 18-9-15 (1956).
95 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 109.23-109.99 (Page 1953).
96 6 S.C. Code §§ 67-71 to 67-75 (Supp. 1959).
97 1 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 12,

§§

8A-81 (Supp. 1959.).

98 5 Idaho Code Ann. § 30-601 (Supp. 1959).
99 Soc. Welfare Law §§ 481-483-a. Twenty other states have similar statutes.
100 Id. § 482-c.
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tions, and charitable corporations organized primarily for educational,
religious, or hospital purposes are excluded from coverage. These limitations and exclusions have been criticized by some writers"° ' and defended
by others. 0 2
It is not proposed herein to consider the relative merits of the criticisms of the traditional approach which have been made and the corrective measures which have been proposed, or to consider whether the
present New York statutes on the supervision of charitable trusts and
corporations are adequate. This would have gone far beyond the
scope of the author's study for the Commission. But the subject has
been discussed for the sake of completeness and also because it illustrates
that the problem is much broader than the matter of accumulations.
Estimates as to the amounts involved vary. Assets of the philanthropies
have been estimated in recent years in such varying amounts as $30 billion, 0 3 $50 billion, 1' 4 and $64 billion. 05 In 1953 it was estimated that
there were between 60 and 100 foundations having assets of $10,000,000
or more (exclusive of colleges, universities, and religious organizations).'o6
The foundations alone are said to have assets totaling $112 billion. 0 7
In the light of figures such as these, it becomes apparent that the problem is too vast to be solved by a few provisos relating to accumulations.
(5) Effect of Internal Revenue Code on Accumulations for Charity
Two fairly recently enacted provisions of the United States Internal
Revenue Code have an impact on accumulations by or for charitable
trusts, corporations, and foundations. The first of these is section 504
(a),"'8 which denies exemption from income tax to certain charitable
corporations, community chests, funds, and foundations, otherwise exempt, for any taxable year if the amounts accumulated out of income
101 See, e.g., Forer, "Forgotten Funds: Suggesting Disclosure Laws for Charitable Funds,"
105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1044, 1055-57, 1060-61 (1957); Karst "The Efficiency of the Charitable
Dollar: An Unftlfilled State Responsibility," 73 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 456 (1960). The 1959
California amendment to the Uniform Act (supra note 93) makes the statute cover all
charitable corporations and trustees holding property for charitable purposes over which the
state or the Attorney General has enforcement or supervisory powers.
102 See, e.g., Bogert, "Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities,"
52 Mich. L. Rev. 633, 653-54 (1954).
103 Lynn, "Legal and Economic Implications of the Emergence of Quasi-Public Wealth,"
65 Yale L.J. 786, 801, n.65 (1956).
104 Hayes, "Corporate Charitable Giving," 91 Trusts & Estates 492, 494-95 (1952).
105 Report of the (N.Y.) Joint Legislative Committee on Charitable and Philanthropic
Agencies and Organizations 15 (1954).
106 Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate Foundations and Other Organizations (The Hays Report), H.R. Rep. No. 2514, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1953). (The
statistics cited to this and the three preceding footnotes are found in Vestal, "Critical Evaluation of the Charitable Trust As a Giving Device," 1957 Wash. U.L.Q. 195, 198, n.14)
107 New York Times, July 11, 1960, § 1, p. 1, col. 3.
(Similar provisions were contained in § 3814 of the
108 26 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1959).
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, amended by 64 Stat. 958 (1950)).
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by any such organization during that year, or any prior year, and not
actually paid out by the end of the year
(a) are unreasonable in amount or duration in order to carry out the
charitable purpose or function of such organization; or
(b) are used to a substantial degree for other than charitable purposes
or functions; or
(c) are invested in such manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of
the organization's charitable purposes or functions.
These provisions do not apply to
(a) any religious organization (other than a trust);
(b) any educational organization with a regular faculty, curriculum
and student body;
(c) any governmental organization;
(d) any organization operated, supervised, controlled, or principally
supported by a religious organization (other than a trust); or
(e) any organization for medical or hospital care, medical education
or research, or agricultural research.
Also excepted from the operation of the statute is any income derived
from a testamentary trust created prior to January 1, 1951. If a testamentary trust created after that date makes accumulation of income
mandatory, the provision relating to unreasonableness in amount or duration applies only to income accumulated during a taxable year of the
trust beginning after the expiration of the common law perpetuities
period (lives in being and twenty-one years).
The other provision is section 681,109 which in general imposes limitations on the charitable deduction allowable in determining the income
tax liability of an estate or trust. Under section 681(c), if the income
accumulated for charitable purposes during the taxable year or any prior
year and not actually paid out by the end of the year
(a) is unreasonable in amount or duration in order to carry out the
charitable purposes; or
(b) is used to a substantial degree for other than charitable purposes; or
(c) is invested in such manner as to jeopardize the interests of the
charitable beneficiaries;
then the allowance for a charitable deduction is limited to the amount
actually paid out during the year and shall not exceed twenty per cent
(Similar provisions were contained in § 162(g) of the
109 26 U.S.C. § 681(c) (1959).
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, amended by 64 Stat. 954 (1950)).
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of the taxable income of the trust (computed without the benefit of the
charitable deduction generally allowed to a trust but with the benefit
of the deduction allowed an individual).
Again there is excepted from the provision relating to reasonableness
of an accumulation, any income derived from a testamentary trust created
prior to January 1, 1951. If a testamentary trust created after that date
makes accumulation of income mandatory, the provision concerning
reasonableness applies only to income accumulated during a taxable
year of the trust beginning after the expiration of the common-law perpetuities period.
A recent amendment to another section of the Code makes this exception applicable to income derived from an inter vivos trust established during the lifetime of a decedent dying before January 1, 1951,
but apparently only for the limited purpose of determining whether a
corporation owned in whole or in part by such a trust is a "personal
''
holding company."

The regulations under section 504 do little more than restate the provisions of the statute, but they do define the terms "income" and "accumulated income" (assimilating the latter to the accumulated earnings
or profits of a corporation), and provide that in determining the reasonableness of an accumulation out of income certain types of capital gains
will be disregarded.'
The regulations under section 681(c) are similar
in effect." 2
There are some interesting rulings of the Internal Revenue Service
under these sections. Thus, contributions to a charitable organization
are not regarded as income in determining whether there has been an
unreasonable accumulation, and distributions for charitable purposes
may be shown as a reduction of current income before being charged to
current contributions or prior contributed capital." 3
The accumulation of capital gains and of a portion of annual dividend
and interest income for a ten-year period in order to restore past invasion of capital which had been used for contributions to charity was held
not an unreasonable accumulation. 114
An accumulation of income for a three-year period was held not unreasonable, provided the amount permanently retained was only such
as was necessary to restore prior charitable grants made from capital
110 69 Stat. 718 (1955), 26 U.S.C. 542 (1958), amending 68A Stat. 182 (1954).
"II

Treas. Reg. § 1.504-1 (1958).

112 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.681(a)-1, 1.681(c)-i (1957).

13 Rev. Rul. 58-535, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 270.
114 Rev. Rul. 54-227, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 291.
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(constituting about one year's income) and the balance of the accumulation was distributed at the end of the three-year period.'15
There have been several court decisions under section 504, or its predecessor, section 3814 of the 1939 Code. In Samuel FriedlandFoundation v. United States," 6 the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey found that the foundation had the status of a charitable
organization because of its ultimate purpose (to promote medical care,
education, and research) and had not lost this status by reason of its
financial activities and investments in stock, debentures and mortgages.
The challenged accumulations came to $288,492.47 for a three-year
period."

7

The court found that this was not unreasonable, applying as

criteria the tests (a) whether the organization had a concrete program
for the accumulation of income to be devoted to a charitable purpose,
and (b) whether in the light of existing circumstances the program was
a reasonable one. Here the goal was to raise $500,000 for a medical
research center for Brandeis University. The foundation had started
with $50,000 and could expect annual contributions of about $50,000. At
the normal rate of earnings on investment its goal would be reached in
from six to eight years. This was not unreasonable, said the Court:
The retention of income by a charitable organization for six, seven or
even eight years pursuant to a project to provide an established educational institution with a medical research building is certainly of equal
if not greater benefit to the public than requiring the distribution in each
taxable year of income received by that organization. And it follows that
if the program is reasonable no amount of accumulation out of income
short of the dollar goal can offend the statutory provision; in fact, the
greater the accumulation the more rapidly the public benefit will accrue." 8
In Randall Foundation,Inc. v. Riddell,119 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit never reached the question of the reasonableness of the accumulations, holding that the nature of the "foundation's" business activities were such that it was a business, and not a
charitable organization, even though its ultimate aim may have been
to establish a home for underprivileged boys. The court indicated that
it disagreed with the findings in the Friedland case on this preliminary
question.' 20
In Tell Foundation v. Wood,' 2 ' the United States District Court for
115 Rev. Rul. 54-137, 1954-1, Cum. Bull. 289.
144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956).
These figures represented dividends, interest, and capital gains (but not contributions),
less operating expenses and charitable distributions.
118 144 F. Supp. 74, 93.
119 244 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1957).
116
117

120
121

Id. at 808 n.9.
52 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1801 (D. Ariz. 1957).
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the District of Arizona held that the foundation was an exempt organization, and that for the two taxable years from July 1, 1952, to June 30,
1954, it had not accumulated its income unreasonably, had not used its
accumulated income to a substantial degree for non-charitable purposes,
and had not invested its income in such manner as to jeopardize carrying
out its charitable purposes. The report of the case sets forth only the
court's ultimate findings and it is not possible to draw any conclusions
from these as to the rationale of the decision.
In Truscott v. United States,122 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania upheld the tax-exempt status of
a foundation established to create a fund for retirement benefits for the
employees of a corporation, or if this should prove impractical, for a
scholarship fund for Gettysburg College. Income was to be accumulated
for ten years before the fund was to commence operations. This involved
an increase in the value of the assets from an unspecified amount in
1950 to $81,680 by 1957, and to an estimated figure of $107,000 by 1960
(plus a $19,000 tax refund as a result of the court's decision). If the
fund had started to operate in 1950, the average monthly benefit per
eligible employee would have been $15; by 1960 it would be about $60
if the accumulation was permitted. The court found that the fund carried a "social benefit," that the period of accumulation was reasonable
(actually necessary) and not longer than needed, and that there was
no violation of section 3814 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
In The Skiffman Foundation,123 a charitable organization, formed in
1948 with a capital of $1000, in 1951 purchased rental properties for
$1,150,000, borrowing $1,000,000 for this purpose. During the five years
following it used a substantial portion of its net income from rentals
in complete retirement of its indebtedness but also made substantial
contributions to charity. Thereafter it distributed substantially all its
net income to charity. The Tax Court held that it was a tax-exempt
organization and that its use of yearly income to retire indebtedness was
not an unreasonable accumulation, or an accumulation for nonexempt
purposes, within section 3814 of the 1939 Code and section 504 of the
1954 Code.
Assuming, but not deciding, that the use of income, year by year, to
pay an indebtedness incurred in acquiring income-producing property
constitutes an accumulation of income, such accumulation here24involved
is neither unreasonable nor for substantially nonexempt purposes.'
12
123
124

1 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 1743 (ElD. Pa. 1958).
32 T.C. 1073 (1959).

Id. at 1081.
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Two cases have been found under the predecessor to section 681, which
was section 162 of the 1939 Code, but both involved the statute before
it was amended to make specific reference to accumulations.
2 5 the donor had, in
In Arthur Jordan Foundation v. Commissioner,:
1928, established a perpetual trust, named the Jordan Foundation, for
rather vaguely described charitable purposes. Until the net assets reached
$5,000,000, from ten per cent to fifty per cent of the annual earnings
were to be accumulated and the balance was to be distributed for the
purposes of the trust. Thereafter, the entire net earnings were to be
distributed, except that any losses in principal were to be replenished
out of earnings. In 1948 the foundation took over and operated two
music stores in Washington, D. C. The Commissioner then ruled that it
had lost its tax-exempt status. The Tax Court held that it was taxable
as a trust and entitled to the charitable deductions allowed by section
162, but that this included only actual distributions for charity and not
the income withheld and accumulated. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the income accumulated had been
"permanently set aside for the use of" charitable organizations or "used
exclusively for charitable and related purposes."
The principle which to us seems controlling in this case is the reasonable
certainty that the beneficent purposes of the trust will be greatly served
as the investment fund expands and reaches the goal fixed by the settlor.
It may be expected that as the fund increases the income available for
direct application to charitable or related purposes will increase accordingly. There can be no other reason, under the terms of the trust instrument, for adding to the fund. On the other hand, anything which retards
the growth of the fund necessarily reduces the amount of the income available for direct charitable purposes. The purpose of investment is solely
and exclusively to produce more income for those purposes. To subject
to tax that part of the income which is retained as a part of the corpus
would thus
very materially impair the possibility of achieving those ob126
jectives.

As mentioned above, this case was decided before section 162 of the
1939 Code was amended to include specific reference to accumulations,
the only question under the statute as it then read being whether income which was accumulated rather than distributed was "permanently
set aside for the use" of charitable organizations or was "used exclusively" for charitable and related purposes.
In John Danz Charitable Trust v. Commissioner,2' the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a two-one decision, distinguished the
125 210

126
127

F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1954).

Id. at 889.

231 F.2d 673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 828 (1956), rehearing denied, 353

U.S. 951 (1957).
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Jordan case on the ground that, whereas in that case the ultimate beneficiaries were all charitable organizations, in the case of the Danz Trust
there was no assurance that the accumulated income would ultimately
be so used, since the settlor had reserved the power to designate the ultimate charitable beneficiaries, and in the meantime the funds were being
used for business and speculative purposes. The dissenting judge thought
that the case could not be distinguished from the Jordan case.
Some of the background of this tax legislation, and the attitude toward
it both of representatives of the foundations and of the Internal Revenue
Service, may be found in the Proceedings of the New York University
Fourth Biennial Conference on Charitable Foundations held in 1959,128
but no definitive conclusions were reached. How effective these provisions will be in limiting accumulations by charitable trusts and charitable
organizations cannot now be predicted. It seems reasonably clear that
they will discourage accumulations beyond the common law perpetuities
period, as well as any other accumulations that cannot be reasonably
justified by some sound plan which promises to be of ultimate benefit
to charity and which does not involve an undue amount of business
operations and speculation. Whether they will have any further effect
is a matter of surmise. It does seem significant that the Government
has not yet been able to persuade a court to hold an accumulation "unreasonable" under these statutes. Moreover, it should be noted that
the provisions have no application to religious organizations, educational
institutions, hospitals, or organizations for medical or agricultural research, which are rather significant omissions.
(6) Common-Law Rule on Charitable Accumulations
The common-law rule on charitable accumulations can be fairly simply
stated. There are no specific restrictions on the amount or duration of
such accumulations, but a court of equity has jurisdiction to supervise
them as to reasonableness in both these respects.' 29 While this rule is
recognized, in the absence of statute, in nearly all jurisdictions, there
appear to be very few cases in which such accumulations have been declared unreasonable, even where intended to be of very long duration. 130
128 Proceedings of N.Y.U. Fourth Biennial Conference on Charitable Foundations 186-87,
233-34, 277-87, 290-91 (1959).
129 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 353, at 522-26 (1953) ; Restatement, Property § 442
(1944) ; 4 Scott, Trusts § 401.9, at 2886-91 (1956).
130 The cases actually invalidating or questioning such accumulations appear to be quite
old. In Hillyard v. Miller, 10 Pa. 326,336 (1849), Gibson, J., thought a perpetual
accumulation for charity would be void "for it would ultimately draw into its vortex
all the property in the state." Girard Trust Co. v. Russell, 179 Fed. 446 (1910); Collings
v. Davis, 17 Ohio C.C. R. (n.s.) 221 (1911), aff'd, 87 Ohio St. 504, 102 N.E. 1122 (1912).
Cf. City of Philadelphia v. Girard's Heirs, 45 Pa. 9 (1863). In Matter of Stevens, 164 Pa.
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The tendency is for the court to uphold the provision for accumulation,
stating that if at a future time it appears that an unreasonable amount
has been accumulated, or the accumulation has continued for too long
a time, it will take appropriate action. Thus, accumulations for charity
have been upheld although directed to last 99 years,'3 1 or 125 years.' 32
Benjamin Franklin, who died in 1790, left £1000 in trust to the City
of Boston for the purpose of making loans at interest to young married
artificers to assist them in setting up in business, with the proviso that
all interest was to be accumulated for 100 years, at which time he anticipated the fund would amount to £131,000, of which £100,000 was to
be laid out in public works; the remaining £31,000 were to be held in
the trust for the same purposes and under the same conditions for another 100 years. "At the end of the second Term, if no unfortunate
accident has prevented the operation, the Sum will be Four Millions
and sixty one Thousand Pounds Sterling; of which I leave one Million
sixty one Thousand Pounds to the Disposition of the Inhabitants of
the Town of Boston and Three Millions to the Disposition of the Government of the State, not presuming to carry my views farther."':3 3 This
will has been before the courts many times and has been upheld. Although the supply of eligible young married artificers has dwindled to
zero, Franklin's predictions as to the amount of the accumulations proved
over-sanguine. In 1894, 100/131 of the principal, or $298,602.04, with
interest, amounting to $329,300.38, was paid to the Boston City Treasurer, and this money plus accumulations, aggregating $435,000, together
with an equal sum given by Andrew Carnegie, was used to establish
the Franklin Union, now the Franklin Technical Institute. 134 The balance has continued to accumulate. In 1958 the Massachusetts Legislature authorized immediate payment to the Franklin Technical Institute
of the portion distributable to the Commonwealth in 1990, provided
the Supreme Court authorized termination of the trust and the making
of such payment. 135 Despite this statute, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts declined to exercise its "authority in equity to terminate
the trust."
We are not convinced that his [Franklin's] charitable objectives have
ceased to be in accord with the public interest or have become so unreasonable under current conditions that we should exercise our undoubted
209, 30 Aft. 243 (1894), an accumulation for an indefinite period was approved when it
turned out that it had required but little time.
131 Lyme High School Ass'n v. Ailing, 113 Conn. 200, 154 Adt. 439 (1931).
132 Allaun v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 190 Va. 104, 56 S.E.2d 83 (1949).
133 Franklin Foundation v. Attorney General, 163 N.E.2d 662, 665 (Mass. 1960).
134

Id. at 666 n.1.

135 Mass. Stat., ch. 596, § 1 (1958).
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equitable power of termination even if the loan program has ceased all
usefulness.
We also agree that Franklin did intend that the accumulation should
be achieved by the device of making loans to young artificers. But we have
been shown nothing to justify the suggestion that he would wish all
accumulation to cease if not capable of accomplishment in that way. That
the trust will not attain by the date set for termination the principal
amount estimated by the testator is unimportant. We observe in the
codicil an intent to provide substantial gifts to future generations in the
two cities. We shall not defeat that intent by destroying the trust now
as to the Commonwealth and the city of Boston.
No useful purpose would be served by analysis of the cases cited by
the plaintiff. Franklin's codicil is unique.' 3 6
While this is perhaps an extreme case, it is a graphic illustration of the
reluctance of the courts to interfere with a charitable accumulation, even
one of two-centuries duration, which the legislature thought should be
brought to an end, so long as some possibility exists of a charitable purpose being served thereby.
(7) Statutory Provisions on Accumulations for Charity
A few jurisdictions beside New York have statutes which deal specifically with accumulations by or for a charitable trust or corporation.
Certain others have statutes which apply to accumulations generally,
with no specific exemption for charity.
Arizona-The Arizona statute permits accumulation of rents and profits of real property "for the sole benefit of a literary or charitable corporation" organized under the laws of Arizona, but such accumulation
must terminate "upon the expiration of 21 years from the time when
it is directed to commence."'13 7 If the direction for the accumulation is
for a longer time, it is void as to the excess.3 8 There is apparently no
statutory restriction on accumulation of the income of personal
39
property.
California-Underthe California statute, a nonprofit corporation for
charitable or eleemosynary purposes may not accumulate income for a
period longer than five years, except as specially approved by the Attorney General. 40 The general California statute on accumulations permits them for the benefit of any person, object, or purpose for a period
measured by lives in being and twenty-one years.'41 It would appear
36 Franklin Foundation v. Attorney General, 163 N.E.2d 662, 669 (Mass. 1960).
137 11 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-348 B.3. (1956).
138 Id. § 33-238C.

139 6 American Law of Property § 25.112 (Casner ed. Supp. 1952 & 1958) (citing
Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin cases construing substantially identical statutes).
140 Cal. Corp. Code § 10207.
'41 Cal. Civ. Code § 724 (as amended by Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 470).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 46

from the wording that this statute applies to accumulations for a charitable purpose, although there seem to be no cases on the point.'42
Pennsylvania-The Pennsylvania statute on accumulations provides
specifically that it shall not apply to "direction or authorizations to
accumulate income in a trust for any charitable purpose or purposes."' 4
Although the present Pennsylvania statute, enacted in 1956, substantially
revised the accumulations provision of the Wills Act of 1947, in this
144
respect there was no change.

Wisconsin-Wisconsin formerly had a statute identical with that of
Arizona, but repealed it in 1957, and substituted a statute permitting
accumulations for the benefit of any person or persons for such period
145
as may be directed by the instrument passing the property.
Other American Jurisdictions-A number of other states have general
statutes on accumulations, which do not specifically mention charities,
and it is not always clear whether they apply to accumulations for
charitable purposes. The Montana statute is comparable in wording
to the California statute mentioned above.'4 6 Presumably it applies to
accumulations for a charitable purpose.147
On the other hand, Illinois has indicated that its statute may not
apply to accumulations for charity which are subject to the control of
a court of equity. 43
The Indiana statute permits accumulations for lives in being and
twenty-one years. 149 It is silent on accumulations for charity, but decisions of the Indiana courts prior to enactment of the statute, and recently reaffirmed, indicate that in any event such accumulations are
subject to the control of a court of equity.150
The Alabama statute limits accumulations to those for a period of
ten years or the minority of an infant.'
There is a dictum that this
statute applies to accumulations for charity. 152 However, the statute
has been very narrowly construed so as to limit its application to trusts
142 6 American Law of Property § 25.116, at 401 (Casner ed. 1952).
143 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 301.6(b) (1) (Purdon Supp. 1959).
144 See Pa. Act of 1947, Apr. 24, P.L. 100, § 6(5).
145 Wis. Laws 1957, ch. 561, §§ 1 & 2.

146 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 67.412 (1947). A recent amendment makes clear that
an accumulation directed for a longer term is void as to the excess only. Id. § 67.413
(Supp. 1959).

147 See 6 American Law of Property § 25.116, at 401 (1952).
148 Webb v. Webb, 340 Ill. 407, 172 N.E. 730, Annot., 71 A.L.R. 404 (1930); Summers
v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 335 Ill.
564, 167 N.E. 777 (1929).
149 Ind. Ann. Stat. § 51-106 (Burns Supp. 1951 & 1960).
150 Quinn v. Peoples Trust & Sav. Co., 223 Ind. 317, 60 N.E.2d 281 (1945).
151 Ala. Code Ann. tit. 47, f146 (1940).
152 Thurlow v. Berry, 247 Ala. 631, 25 So. 2d 726 (1946).

1960]

ACCUMULATIONS

for "accumulations only." This allows for a great many types of accumulation which would be invalid under the more typical statute. 153
The Minnesota statute, applicable only to rents and profits of real
estate, limits accumulations to those for the benefit of a minor within
the period of his minority.'1 It probably does not apply to accumulations for charity, but there are no cases. The situation in South Dakota
is similar to that in Minnesota. 5 5 The same was formerly true of North
Dakota (except that the rule was also applicable to accumulations of
income from personal property) but the North Dakota statute was repealed in 1959.156

The Nevada statute on accumulations 157 seems to apply only to spendthrift trusts. In other situations the common law apparently applies. 15
Vermont has an unusual statute, of a type at one time more common,
which limits the property holdings of a charitable corporation to
$10,000,000, and provides for forfeiture of any excess to the State.'5 9
England-The Thellusson Act, still in force with slight modifications,
limits accumulations of income to a period not longer than (a) the life
of the grantor, or (b) twenty-one years from the death of the grantor,
or (c) a minority or minorities in being, or (d) the minority of a person
or persons otherwise entitled to the income. 60 In practice, this statute
does not apply to every case of an accumulation for charity since, while
a present gift to a charity is held valid, under the rule of Saunders v.
Vautier,161 the charitable beneficiary may require that the trust be
terminated and the entire corpus be paid over to it, thus stopping the
accumulation. 1

2

But if the charity has only a future interest, so that

it is not in a position to invoke the rule of Saunders v Vautier, the statute
applies. 63 In an appropriate case, cy pres will be invoked to carry out
the general charitable intention of the grantor. 64 It is interesting to
note that the English statute applies whether the trustee is directed or
merely empowered to accumulate income. 6 5
6 American Law of Property § 25.106 at 380 (Casner ed. 1952).
154 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 500.17(2) (1947).
155 S.D. Code § 51.0304 (1939), as amended by S.D. Laws 1955, ch. 225.
156 NJ). Laws of 1959, ch. 330, at 661.
'57 Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.020-166.160 (1959).
158 6 American Law of Property § 25.118 (Casner ed. 1952); 3 Simes & Smith, Law of
Future Interests § 1466, at 346 (1956).
159 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 132 (1958).
160 Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, §§ 164-66; 20 Halsbury's Statutes
of England 771-77 (2d ed. 1950).
161 4 Beav. 115, 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ch. 1841).
162 Wharton v. Masterman, [1895] A.C. 186 (H.L.).
163 Jefferies v. Martin, [1936] 2 All E.R. 626 (Ch.).
Cf. Berry v. Geen, [1938] A.C.
575 (H.L.).
164 Re Bradwell's Will Trusts, [1952] 2 All E.R. 286 (Ch.).
165 Re Robb's Will Trusts, [1953] 1 All E.R. 920 (Ch.).
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RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION

Granted that the New York statutory provisos on charitable accumulations were obsolete, the question remained what substitute provisions
should be proposed. There appeared to be two alternatives:
(a) To subject such accumulations to the same restrictions as are now
applicable to accumulations generally, that is, to permit them for lives
in being, periods of gestation, and twenty-one years, but no longer; or
(b) To place no specific limit on the duration or amount of such
accumulations, but to provide specifically that they should be subject
to judicial supervision and control.
The Commission chose the second of these alternatives. It represents
the rule followed in the great majority of American jurisdictions. It
parallels the position already taken by the New York courts with respect
to the applicability to charities of the rule against suspension of the
power of alienation or of absolute ownership.' 66 It is substantially the
rule now in effect, under the first proviso of each of the basic accumulations statutes, 67 in the case of gifts in trust to educational institutions.
The Commission accordingly recommended that the provisos contained
in the second, third and fourth paragraphs of section 61 of the Real
Property Law and section 16 of the Personal Property Law should be
replaced by a provision stating that (a) a direction for an accumulation,
in a trust for religious, educational, charitable or benevolent uses, is not
invalid by reason of the provisions of sections 61 and 16 limiting accumulations in other cases; (b) in the absence of a direction for accumulation in the instrument creating the trust, and unless such accumulation is prohibited, expressly or by implication, by the terms of such
instrument or by statute, the trustee shall be deemed authorized by
such instrument to accumulate income, in accordance with the proposed
amendment, to the extent he deems necessary or advisable to carry out
the purposes of the trust; and (c) that any accumulation in such a trust,
whether or not directed by the instrument creating the trust, shall be
subject to judicial supervision and control with respect to its reasonableness, amount, and duration, and in any other respect, and the sections of the Real Property Law and the Personal Property Law with
respect to jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Surrogate's Court
106 Matter of MacDowell, 217 N.Y. 454, 112 N.E. 177 (1916); Allen v. Stevens, 161
N.Y. 122, 55 N.E. 568 (1899); Matter of Myles, 5 Misc. 2d 163, 159 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Surr.
Ct. N.Y. County 1956); Matter of Crespi, 158 Misc. 383, 285 N.Y. Supp. 780 (Surr. Ct.
Kings County 1936); Matter of DeLong, 140 Misc. 92, 250 N.Y. Supp. 504 (Surr. Ct.
Saratoga County 1931).
167 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 61; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 16.
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and to the authority of the Attorney General in relation to gifts for
charitable purposes, shall be applicable." 8
Attention is called to the following specific features of those recommendations:
(a) The terminology "in trust" was retained. This meant, if the
author's analysis as set forth above is correct, that the proposed amendment would apply to charitable trusts as such and to gifts to a charitable
corporation or foundation for a specific purpose, but probably not to
unrestricted gifts to charitable corporations or foundations.
(b) Discretionary accumulations would be subject to control, in the
case of trusts or specific gifts, as they apparently are now.
(c) The ambiguous reference to "the regents of the university" would
be deleted.
Bills incorporating these recommendations were introduced in both
the Senate and Assembly. 1 9 The Assembly bill passed but the Senate
and Assembly bills were not reported out of the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
While this legislation was pending it was studied by several bar association committees. It was approved by the Committee on the Surrogates'
Courts of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, which
makes the following observation:
In view of the infinite variety of charitable trusts, the differences in
their size, assets, and purposes, the present rigid limitations on accumulation of income, imposed without regard to the special circumstances of
each trust, are most inappropriate. The bill is desirable in vesting the
power of regulation of accumulations in the courts, which, with the aid of
the Attorney General representing the beneficiaries, can permit the degree
of flexibility required in each case. With this judicial supervision there
should be no reason to fear that the freedom from existing limitations
would give rise to abuses resulting in unreasonable accumulations.
For the reasons stated, the bill is approved.- 70
Strong disapproval, however, was voiced by the Committee on the
Surrogates' Court of the New York County Lawyers Association. Inter
alia, the Committee said:
This proposed statutory authorization is a runaway, with unlimited
bounds beyond imagination. It involves questions of public policy far
beyond anything envisaged in the amendments to these statutes in 1959.
During the past thirty years, under the impact of the tax laws and in
particular the Federal Estate Tax Law, charitable foundations and trusts
168
169

1960 McKinney's Sess. Law News of N.Y, No. 4, P. A-128 (March 25, 1960).
Sen. Intr. No. 2669, Fr. No. 2794 (1960); Assembly Intr. No. 3568, Pr. No. 3665

(1960).
170 Ass'n Bar City of N.Y., Comm. on State Legislation, Bull. No. 5, p. 321, at 323 (1960).
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have come into existence in large and increasing numbers and amounts.
They have come rapidly into control of enormous amounts of wealth. The
situation calls for a restriction, rather than enlargement, of powers. A
bill designed to compel the distribution of income, rather than to permit
the capitalization of income, would be more appropriate.17 '

Unquestionably, the failure of these two important bar associations
to agree on the wisdom of the proposed legislation contributed to its
tabling by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
CONCLUSION

While it cannot be claimed that the New York statutes on accumulations are perfect, they are vastly improved over what they were. The
ancient fear of accumulations, stemming from Thellusson's case, 172 and
picturesquely expressed by Chief Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania in
1849 that a perpetual accumulation might eventually "draw into its
vortex all the property in the state,"'173 have failed to materialize. 74
The narrow New York restrictions, born of this fear, have been replaced
by the simple common law rule permitting accumulations for the period
of perpetuities. This should give the needed flexibility for estate planning and trust administration.
Whether section 63 of the Real Property Law, discussed above at
page 18, will require amendment, experience under the new statutes
should tell. Admittedly, the charitable-trust situation is less satisfactory.
The three provisos discussed above are archaic, complex, and confusing.
But they can do not great harm, so long as it is held that the new rule
permitting accumulations for the perpetuities period applies to charitable
trusts. No one argues that these provisos should be retained. The real
question is whether a more liberal or a stricter rule should be applied
to charitable accumulations than the rule permitting accumulations for
lives in being and twenty-one years. But the problem cannot be considered from. the standpoint of accumulations only. There is much merit
in the argument that greater controls are needed over charitable trusts,
corporations, and foundations. The Nathan Report and the legislation
sponsored by the Attorneys General point the way. But legislation
aimed solely at accumulations, whether as part of the law of estates or
as part of the income tax law, is at best a palliative, of little value in
most cases, possibly harmful in a few, and at the very least deceptive
in promising more than it can perform.
171 N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, Comm. on the Surrogates' Court, Report No. 289,
at p. 3 (1960).
1"2 Thellusson v. Woodword, 11 Ves. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (H.L. 1805).
173 Hillyard v. Miller, 10 Pa. 326, 336 (1849).
174 Simes, Public Policy and The Dead Hand 94-99 (1955).

